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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Martin Guzman Ambriz appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence.  On appeal, Ambriz 
claims the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Ambriz drank approximately eight beers at his home and then began 
driving.  (R., p. 92.)  When Ambriz made a turn, both of his passenger side tires 
went off the roadway and onto the gravel on the side of the road.  (Id.)  Deputy 
Zalewski and Deputy Reusze both observed Ambriz‟s vehicle leave the roadway.  
(Id.)   Both deputies also then saw Ambriz‟s vehicle quickly jerk from side to side 
within its lane.  (Id.)  The deputies initiated a traffic stop.  (Id.) 
Ambriz failed field sobriety tests and Ambriz‟s breath results were .209, 
insufficient, and .195.  (R., p. 10.)  Because Ambriz had previously been 
convicted of felony DUI in 2010, the state charged Ambriz with felony DUI.  (R., 
pp. 40-42.)   
Ambriz filed a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic 
stop.  (R., p. 60.)  Ambriz claimed the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.  (Id.)  The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 
83-84.)   
Deputy Zalewski testified that when Ambriz‟s vehicle made a right hand 
turn, both of his right tires fully went off the roadway and onto the gravel.  
(9/28/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 – p. 8, L. 2, p. 15, Ls. 8-11.)  She further testified that the 
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vehicle then started making a “jerking motion.”  (9/28/15 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 3-8.)  
Deputy Zalewski‟s police vehicle was equipped with a dashboard camera.  
(9/28/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 6 – p. 11, L. 24.)  The dashboard camera started recording 
after Ambriz‟s right tires fully went off the roadway.  (Id.)   
Deputy Reusze also testified that she saw Ambriz‟s vehicle drive off the 
road into the gravel.  (9/28/15 Tr., p. 30, L. 18 – p. 31, L. 8.)  Ambriz testified.  
(9/28/15 Tr., p. 40, L. 19 – p. 47, L. 5.)  Ambriz denied leaving the roadway and 
driving on the gravel.  (9/28/15 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 10-22.)  He also denied making any 
jerking motions with his car.  (9/28/15 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 1-3.)  Ambriz admitted to 
drinking approximately eight beers before he drove.  (9/28/15 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 2-
22.)   
The district court denied Ambriz‟s motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 91-96.)  
The district court analyzed the credibility of the witnesses and determined that 
the deputies‟ testimony regarding Ambriz‟s driving pattern was reliable and 
credible.  (R., p. 95.)  The district court also found, in part because of Ambriz‟s 
alcohol consumption, that his “ability to clearly perceive and accurately recall the 
events surrounding the stop at issue is questionable.”  (Id.)  The district court 
concluded: 
As set forth above, the deputies testified that the Defendant drove 
in the gravel on the side of 16th Street and made quick, jerky 
movements within his lane on Pomerelle Avenue.  This driving 
pattern was not within the broad range of normal driving behaviors.  
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputies had 
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to 
traffic laws or that other criminal activity was afoot.  Therefore, the 
State met its burden of establishing that the stop of the Defendant‟s 
vehicle was an investigatory detention based upon reasonable 
suspicion and that it was therefore reasonable and lawful.  
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(R., p. 95.)   
 
Ambriz pled guilty to felony DUI, but reserved the right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 102-103; 12/22/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 17 – p. 
9, L. 16.)  The district court entered judgment and sentenced Ambriz to seven 
years with two years fixed but retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 136-138; 2/16/16 Tr., 
p. 11, L. 2 – p. 13, L. 14.)  Ambriz filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp. 140-141.)   
 4 
ISSUE 
 
Ambriz states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ambriz‟s motion to 
suppress?   
 
(Appellant‟s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Ambriz failed to show the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Ambriz Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion 
To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 Ambriz claims the district court erred when it held the deputies had 
reasonable suspicion that Ambriz‟s vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic 
laws or that other criminal activity was afoot.  Contrary to Ambriz‟s argument, the 
district court did not err.  The deputies observed both of Ambriz‟s passenger side 
tires completely leave the roadway.  Ambriz‟s vehicle then jerked within its lane 
of travel.  The district court correctly found that deputies had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to believe that Ambriz had violated traffic laws or that other 
criminal activity was afoot.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court‟s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.”  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).  The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).  The appellate court also gives deference to any 
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implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.  State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Found That The Deputies Had Reasonable 
Articulable Suspicion To Stop Ambriz‟s Vehicle   
 
The district court made a factual finding that the deputies observed 
Ambriz‟s passenger-side tires drive off the roadway  (R., pp. 92-95.)  The district 
also found that Ambriz drove on the gravel and made jerking movements within 
his lane.  (Id.)  The district court determined that Ambriz‟s “driving pattern was 
not within the broad range of normal driving behaviors.”  (R., p. 95.)  The district 
court considered the totality of the circumstances and held “the deputies had a 
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws or 
that other criminal activity was afoot.”  (Id.)  As a result, the traffic stop was 
based upon reasonable suspicion and “therefore reasonable and lawful.”  (Id.)  
The district court correctly applied the law to the facts when it denied Ambriz‟s 
motion to suppress.   
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle‟s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment‟s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).  
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).  However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
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an officer‟s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime.  Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 
P.3d at 1210.  “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws.”  Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).  “Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer.”  State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted).   
On appeal, Ambriz argues that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion 
because his driving behavior “did not fall outside the broad range of what can be 
described as normal” and the “State did not establish, or even argue, that Mr. 
Ambriz committed a traffic violation.”  (Appellant‟s brief, p. 6.)  Both of Ambriz‟s 
arguments fail to establish the district court erred.   
In support of his first argument, Ambriz cites to State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 
661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition that Ambriz‟s driving 
pattern fell within the broad range of normal driving behavior.  (See Appellant‟s 
brief, pp. 7-9 (citing Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525).)  Contrary to 
Ambriz‟s argument on appeal, Emory did not create a “normal driving behavior” 
exception to traffic laws.  State v. Morris, 159 Idaho 651, 656, 365 P.3d 407, 412 
(Ct. App. 2015), review denied (Feb. 23, 2016).  As explained by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals in Morris:  
Emory did not create a “normal driving behavior” exception to traffic 
laws. We merely used the phrase to denote that the officer had not 
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seen any activity that would support reasonable suspicion that the 
driver was under the influence of an intoxicant. 
 
Id.  Further, Emory is easily distinguished because Emory never left his lane.  
See Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525 (“Emory‟s vehicle was in its 
proper lane and was moving in a straight line down the street.  No weaving or 
crossing of the center dividing line was observed by the officer.”).  Here, the 
deputies saw Ambriz‟s vehicle leave its lane.  (See R., p. 92.)   
 The facts here are closer to Morris, where the Idaho Court of Appeals 
distinguished Emory, and held there was reasonable suspicion to stop Morris 
because the officers witnessed the vehicle leave its lane.  Morris, 159 Idaho at 
656, 365 P.3d at 412. 
In contrast to Emory, the patrol officer witnessed Morris leave his 
lane when there was no circumstance that would have made it 
infeasible to drive in Morris‟ lane. At this point, the patrol officer had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in that he had witnessed 
Morris commit a traffic violation. 
 
Id.   
In addition to leaving the roadway, Ambriz‟s vehicle also quickly jerked 
from side to side within its lane.  (See R., p. 92.)  Jerking movements within the 
lane of travel can contribute to an abnormal driving pattern that supports a 
finding of reasonable suspicion.  See State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 11, 878 
P.2d 184, 185 (Ct. App. 1994) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 
Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000).  In Naccarato, the defendant was “jerking the 
vehicle to correct its motion in one direction or the other” but the vehicle did not 
actually leave its lane.  Id.  Looking at the totality of the circumstances, which 
included this “jerking” within the lane, the magistrate and district court found 
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there was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.  Id.  The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Id.  Likewise, in this case, the district court‟s findings that 
Ambriz‟s vehicle left the roadway and made jerking movements supports its 
conclusion that the deputies had reasonable suspicion to stop Ambriz.   
 Ambriz‟s vehicle leaving it‟s lane of travel and driving on the gravel outside 
the roadway also constituted a traffic violation.  “Idaho Code section 49–630(1) 
requires that drivers drive on the right half of the roadway.”  State v. Slater, 136 
Idaho 293, 298, 32 P.3d 685, 690 (Ct. App. 2001).  “The „roadway‟ means that 
portion of a highway that is „improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular 
travel.‟”  Id. (citing I.C. § 49–119(18)).  The roadway does not include “sidewalks, 
shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way.”  Id.  Therefore driving outside the lane and 
off the roadway constitutes a violation of Idaho Code § 49–630(1).  See e.g. 
Slater, 136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690 (“Accordingly, when Officer Burns 
observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit fleetingly, Burns now possessed 
the requisite reasonable suspicion that Slater had violated I.C. § 49–630 by 
driving on the shoulder of the highway, rather than on the „roadway.‟”); State v. 
Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 445, 362 P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (holding no traffic violation 
where Neal did not drive on the shoulder outside of the roadway).  Here, the 
district court found that Ambriz‟s vehicle left the roadway.  (See, e.g., R., p. 92 
(“Both deputies testified that they saw Defendant‟s vehicle go off the roadway 
with at least the passenger-side tires in the gravel on the side of the road.  The 
vehicle then returned to the roadway and turned right onto Pomerelle Avenue.”).)    
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 In addition to violating Idaho Code § 49–630(1) by leaving the roadway, 
Ambriz also violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1), which requires a driver to drive “as 
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.”  Here, by driving on the gravel 
outside of his lane, Ambriz also violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1).   
On appeal, Ambriz argues that, because neither the state nor the district 
court pointed to a specific statute that Ambriz violated, the officers did not have 
reasonable suspicion to stop him.  (See Appellant‟s brief, p. 10.)  Reasonable 
suspicion does not depend on whether the state or district court cited a particular 
code section during the hearing on the motion to suppress.  Whether there is 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a defendant committed a traffic violation is 
determined based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at 
the time of the stop.  See, e.g., Morris, 159 Idaho at 654, 365 P.3d at 410.  Here, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the deputies had reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Ambriz committed a traffic violation when both his passenger tires 
fully left the roadway.   
   
CONCLUSION 
  
  The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 14th day of September, 2016. 
 
       
  _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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